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You have large parts of the euro area in what we call a “bad 
equilibrium”, namely an equilibrium where you may have self-
fulfilling expectations that feed upon themselves and generate very 
adverse scenarios. (Mario Draghi)1 
1. Introduction 
Financial crises represent one of the toughest conundrums for economic policy-makers and 
financial economists. Following a crisis, the word ‘contagion’ proliferates in headlines, and 
blame is regularly put on investors’ risk appetites. However, a financial crisis may also be 
sparked by the inherent features of an economic system. Investors’ actions may amplify the 
effects of an exogenous shock to the economy, generating a still larger shock (Danielsson et 
al., 2013): in trying to avoid individual losses they might by their very nature trigger a 
market apocalypse (Shin, 2010). This so-called endogeneity constitutes a dimension of 
fragility in today’s highly connected economies and may even threaten the functionality of 
modern free market mechanisms. Thus, it becomes critical for policy-makers to ask questions 
such as: Which economic structures are more prone to this type of market dysfunctionality? 
And what type of policy actions should be taken to break the vicious circle between investor 
actions and adverse market outcomes during financial crises? 
Since 2009, when the debt problems of Greece came to light, the suddenness and magnitude 
of changes in eurozone bond yield spreads have sparked wide debate among economists 
regarding the likely causes. This debate resurrects two conflicting views of debt crises. The 
fundamentalist view is that widening yield spreads reflect serious deterioration in countries’ 
macroeconomic fundamentals. The multiple-equilibria view contends instead that markets 
may not always function optimally, and therefore countries may find themselves in any one 
of a set of possible equilibrium conditions (i.e., distinct scenarios running the gamut from 
stability to full-blown crisis) without experiencing any major change in fiscal fundamentals. 
                                                   
* Ana-Maria Fuertes is Professor in Financial Econometrics at Cass Business School, City University 
London; Elena Kalotychou is a Senior Lecturer at Cass Business School, and Orkun Saka is a Doctoral 
Researcher at Cass Business School, City University London. 
The authors are grateful to Paul De Grauwe, José-Luis Peydró and Christian Wagner for their useful 
comments and suggestions. They also thank participants at the Rimini Conference in Economics and 
Finance (June, 2014), Young Finance Scholars’ Conference and Quantitative Finance Workshop at the 
University of Sussex (May 2014), and seminar participants at Cass Business School, Keele University 
and Brunel University.  
1 Mario Draghi, 6 September 2012. 
See www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2012/html/is120906.en.html.  
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Thus, the decisions of panic-driven investors may lead a country to a crisis that otherwise 
would not have unfolded; this is termed self-fulfilling dynamics.  
The idea that a monetary union lends itself to the devilish effects of self-fulfilling dynamics 
was originally promoted by the Belgian economist Paul De Grauwe, who summed it up in 
his fragility hypothesis (De Grauwe, 2011a,b). This hypothesis states that, by issuing debt in a 
currency that they cannot control, member states are more vulnerable to adverse investor 
sentiment and sudden halts in capital inflows and, hence, more prone to sovereign debt 
crises. De Grauwe’s fragility hypothesis has as its main element the notion of self-fulfilling 
dynamics, namely, market pessimism2 about a sovereign’s ability to service its debt is likely 
to trigger higher interest rates, which will make it harder for the sovereign to roll over its 
short-term debt, creating a feedback effect between investor sentiments and interest rates 
that could trigger default.3 Such a phenomenon is less likely to occur in a sovereign that 
maintains control over its currency, even though its fundamentals may be worse, because the 
markets recognise the presence of a central bank that stands ready to inject the necessary 
liquidity.4 De Grauwe and Yuemei Ji (2013) note that countries with similar fiscal outlooks 
but different currency regimes (e.g., Spain and the United Kingdom) experienced notably 
different borrowing costs in the aftermath of the Greek crisis. This is interpreted as evidence 
that multiple equilibria can exist in the eurozone unless the European Central Bank (ECB) 
takes up the function of lender of last resort, injecting the necessary liquidity in a crisis.5 
Important steps have been taken in this direction.  
The ECB resident announced on 27 July 2012 that the ECB was prepared to “do whatever it 
takes to preserve the euro”.6 On 6 September 2012, the Outright Monetary Transactions 
(OMT) programme was officially launched, under which the ECB would act as a lender of 
last resort () for countries applying to the European Stability Mechanism (ESM).7 This change 
in policy stance provides an ideal laboratory that can serve to shed light on the 
                                                   
2 The term ‘market pessimism’ is employed here to refer to expectations that investors might rationally 
harbour and might later see validated in a self-fulfilling way as a result of the interaction between 
market interest rates and government budget constraints (Calvo, 1988; Corsetti and Dedola, 2013). 
3 Guillermo A. Calvo (1988) was the first to employ the logic of multiple equilibria to rationalize 
sovereign debt crises in countries that issue debt in a foreign currency by explicitly incorporating the 
role of expectations into a government debt auction scheme. Multiple-equilibria models were 
proposed previously for explaining banking crises (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983) and currency crises 
(Obstfeld, 1984). 
4 Giancarlo Corsetti and Luca Dedola (2013) maintain that self-fulfilling debt crises are equally likely 
for a eurozone member and for a country that issues debt in its own currency. They also show that 
central banks have to get the fiscal support of their Treasury in order to provide a credible backstop 
against endogenous market expectations. Since such support is harder to get in a monetary union 
without political unity, one can therefore argue that eurozone countries are more prone to self-
fulfilling dynamics than stand-alone countries. 
5 Thus, the ECB would have to intervene only when there is a real risk of solvency. Opponents assert 
that such a facility might sap governments’ will to impose discipline on their fiscal operations, but that 
risk could be mitigated by the strict fiscal supervision attached to the ECB’s liquidity mechanism. 
Multiple equilibria will cease to exist if the ECB can credibly commit to provide liquidity to a country 
that accepts conditionality and can credibly commit to stop the programme if the country ceases to 
abide by the stipulated conditions. 
6 Mario Draghi, 26 July 2012. See www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2012/html/sp120726.en.html. 
7 OMT is an ECB programme through which the central bank can make purchases (outright 
transactions) in the secondary bond markets of eurozone member states. Conditionality is attached to 
prevent moral hazard.  
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fundamentalist versus multiple-equilibria debate. A thorny issue is that the two schools 
share various that make them difficult to separate empirically.  
There is mounting evidence of what are termed wake-up calls in the eurozone, namely, the 
phenomenon by which markets ignore deteriorating fiscal fundamentals during non-crisis 
periods but become highly sensitive to them in crises.8 Carlos Caceres and coauthors (2010) 
weigh the relative impact of global risk aversion, regional spillovers and country-specific 
fiscal fundamentals on surges in eurozone sovereign bond interest spreads between late 2009 
and early 2010, and they identify fundamentals as the main driving force. Michael G. 
Arghyrou and Alexandros Kontonikas (2012) show that eurozone markets were behaving 
according to a ‘convergence-trade’ model (trading with the expectation that the values of 
similar bonds across the currency area will converge) until the eruption of the global 
financial crisis in the United States, and fundamentals started to matter only after 2007. John 
Beirne and Marcel Fratzscher (2013) document wake-up call contagion as the primary 
channel through which the recent turmoil in eurozone sovereign debt markets was 
expressed. Paolo Manasse and Luca Zavalloni (2013) find that only in crisis periods is 
eurozone sovereign risk strongly linked to the real economy and the labour market.  
Multiple-equilibria models predict that fundamentals matter in the sense that only very bad 
and very good fundamentals would precipitate a single outcome, default or no default, 
respectively; self-fulfilling dynamics have ample space to unfold in between these poles.9 
Hence, advocates of the multiple-equilibria view do not deny increased sensitivity to 
fundamentals such as real GDP growth, public debt ratios and current account to GDP ratios 
in the run-up to the eurozone debt crisis (Aizenman et al., 2013; Grauwe and Ji, 2013). Their 
key contention is instead that bond spreads of eurozone states considered to be on the 
periphery have been too high compared with otherwise similar countries outside the 
eurozone, even after allowing for increased sensitivity to fundamentals, which leaves a role 
for self-fulfilling dynamics in the region. In a nutshell, multiple-equilibria proponents hold 
that, although fundamentals matter, they are not the whole story. As Paul Krugman (2012) 
puts it, “So here’s Europe’s Big Delusion: it’s the belief that Europe’s crisis was essentially 
caused by fiscal irresponsibility … it is more complicated than that.” 
A growing literature investigates the phenomenon of financial contagion (loosely construed, 
with many nuances) among eurozone sovereign debt markets.10 A popular definition of 
contagion, as originally proposed by Kristin J. Forbes and Roberto Rigobon (2002), is a 
significant increase in cross-market linkages following bad shocks to one market. The step-
up in cross-market linkages can take place through channels such as financial institutions, 
shifts in portfolio investment or ‘wake-up calls’; therefore, contagion is often the by-product 
of increased globalisation (Forbes, 2012). This means that contagion threats in the eurozone 
                                                   
8 See Goldstein et al. (2000). This phenomenon is aligned with notions of ‘rational inattention’ by 
which investors may rationally choose to ignore some information when the cost of information 
acquisition/processing is too steep. Some also argue that that the perceived safety of government 
bonds in Europe before the crisis was attributable to the implicit bailout guarantee of the monetary 
union for its members’ debt, but markets started to pay close attention to members’ fiscal positions as 
soon as they realized that there was no such guarantee (Cochrane, 2010)  
9 For a simple theoretical model of debt crises with multiple equilibria, see De Grauwe (2011a). For 
more formal treatments, see Calvo (1988), Gros (2012), Corsetti and Dedola (2011; 2013). 
10 See Caceres et al. (2010), De Grauwe (2011a, b), Arghyrou and Kontonikas (2012), Caporin et al. 
(2013), De Grauwe and Ji (2013, 2014), Manasse and Zavalloni (2013), Alter and Beyer (2013), Mink 
and De Haan (2013), Beirne and Fratzscher (2013), Aizenman et al. (2013), Beetsma et al. (2013), De 
Santis (2014), among others. 
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necessarily go hand-in-hand with greater economic and financial integration among member 
states.  
Marta Gómez-Puig and Simón Sosvilla-Rivero (2013) adduce evidence in this regard by 
documenting episodes of increased Granger causality (a test to determine whether one time 
series can predict another) between peripheral eurozone country bond yields during the 
post-2009 crises. Such episodes can be interpreted as contagion and are found to be related to 
increased banking linkages (financial integration) across countries.  
This paper aims to contribute further empirical evidence on the validity of the fragility 
hypothesis originally articulated by De Grauwe. By using the OMT announcement as a 
‘laboratory’, it tests the hypothesis that countries in a monetary union, lacking control over 
their currency, are vulnerable to ‘unnecessary’ (non- fundamental based) contagion of bad 
news in sovereign debt markets through panic that can become self-fulfilling. It represents 
the first attempt to shed light on the long-standing theoretical debate between 
fundamentalists and multiple-equilibria proponents by investigating whether the change in 
the ECB’s policy stance (the OMT announcement) has effectively curbed the contagion in 
eurozone debt markets. The paper takes a cross-section of sovereign credit default swaps 
(CDS) contracts a representative sample of the ‘periphery’ versus ‘core’ eurozone countries, 
as well a European countries that remain outside the currency area. This allows for an 
assessment of the way that markets have discriminated (in terms of sovereign risk pricing) 
between eurozone ‘periphery’ and ‘core’ countries, and between European countries that 
control their own currency versus those that do not. The methodology is eclectic, deploying a 
principal component analysis, an event-study analysis and a residual ‘herding contagion’ 
analysis of CDS spreads. 
The principal components analysis of eurozone CDS spreads suggests that the OMT 
announcement decreased the overall perception of sovereign risk and volatility for the 
eurozone as a whole and changed the way markets discriminate among sovereigns toward 
more emphasis on fundamentals. The event study reveals that the pre-announcement 
contagion effects from Spain-specific bad news largely receded following the OMT 
announcement. The residual analysis confirms that the OMT announcement alleviated the 
herding contagion previously seen in the region.  
These findings support De Grauwe’s fragility hypothesis. Contagion effects spreading from 
Spain to Italy, Belgium, France and Austria in the period before the OMT announcement are 
no longer apparent after the OMT announcement. Time-series models of sovereign spreads 
confirm the frequent clustering of substantial shocks (hence, the presence of herding 
contagion) for those countries where contagion effects were previously identified, but similar 
clusters were not observed in the post-announcement period. Overall these findings clearly 
support the multiple-equilibria view of the crisis, which does not overlook the importance of 
fundamentals but adds that, in times of massive economic adjustment, panic amplifies the 
initial exogenous shocks and can push an otherwise solvent country toward default. The 
evidence suggests that there is more to the post-2009 eurozone sovereign debt crises than the 
well-documented strengthening of the link between bond yields and fundamentals. In fact, 
the OMT policy has been effective in curbing ‘unnecessary’ contagion infecting eurozone 
credit risk – that is, the prospects of self-fulfilling fear leading to huge interest rates on 
European bonds have receded. Evidence presented in the pages to follow also indirectly 
refutes the belief that the eurozone crisis was solely caused by fiscal irresponsibility 
(Krugman, 2012). 
Amid a heated debate on the OMT programme, ‘core’ members of the eurozone have 
expressed disapproval for the policy by arguing that such unlimited bond-buying promises 
may pave the way for feckless governments to postpone painful structural reforms and 
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austerity plans (in other words, moral hazard). They further argue that the OMT programme 
puts excessive risks on core members that had done nothing to deserve to pay for the 
misdemeanours of the ‘periphery’.11 In sharp contrast, various economists have applauded 
the OMT announcement as game-changer in the European sovereign debt markets (see, e.g., 
Krugman, 2011). The empirical findings from the eclectic methodology employed in this 
paper to investigate the dynamics of European sovereign CDS spreads serve to strengthen 
other supportive evidence from recent studies that find that the OMT programme has had a 
depressive effect on eurozone bond yield spreads and default risks (Falagiarda and Reitz, 
2013; Lucas et al., 2013; Altavilla et al., 2014). 
2. Data Description and Preliminary Analysis 
2.1 Sovereign Credit Default Swaps 
The raw data used for the analysis come from daily midpoint closing spread quotes on five-
year sovereign credit default swap (CDS) contracts from 1 January 2008 to 25 July 2013 
collected from Datastream. The CDS contracts correspond to four ‘peripheral’ eurozone 
countries (Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain), six ‘core’ eurozone countries (Austria, Belgium, 
Finland, France, Germany and the Netherlands), and four non-euro European countries 
(Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom).12 CDS spreads are seen to capture 
default risk more accurately than bond yield spreads because the latter have a time-varying 
non-default component that is strongly related to measures of bond-specific illiquidity 
(Longstaff et al., 2005). 
The evolution of daily CDS spreads, plotted in Figure 1, confirms a first notable bout of 
investor risk aversion and negative perceptions toward peripheral eurozone sovereigns 
around March 2010, when Greece was first rescued. Declines in all CDS spreads are seen 
after 26 July 2012, when ECB President Mario Draghi made it clear that ECB was prepared to 
“do whatever it takes to preserve the euro”; hereafter, this is called the implicit OMT 
announcement date, although the official announcement of the programme occurred only in 
early September 2012.  
Table 1 summarises the distribution of CDS premiums (the rate paid by the recipient of 
credit insurance) over the 12-month window preceding the implicit OMT announcement 
(Panel A) and the 12-month post-announcement window (Panel B). All premiums are 
expressed in basis points. The buyer of the CDS contract (which serves as insurance on 
sovereign debt) pays in US dollars, based on dollar-denominated notional amounts. The last 
column reports the change in CDS spreads from the initial day to the last day of the 
corresponding window.   
                                                   
11 See Hans-Werner Sinn, “Outright monetary infractions”, Project Syndicate, 9 February 2014. 
12 Following the literature, EU Economic and Monetary Union countries that are recent entrants (such 
as Latvia) and other economically small countries (such as Estonia, Slovakia, Malta and Slovenia) are 
excluded from the periphery for the purposes of this paper; see, for instance, Arghyrou and 
Kontonikas (2012), Beirne and Fratzscher (2013), De Santis (2014), Beetsma et al. (2013), De Grauwe 
and Ji (2013, 2014). The exclusion of Greece from the analysis, which is driven by lack of CDS data 
from March 2012, is not material given that it has been shown that the systemic importance of Greece 
lessens notably in the more recent stages of the crisis (see González-Hermosillo and Johnson, 2014). 
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Figure 1. Evolution in daily sovereign CDS spreads from 5 December 2008 to 25 July 2013 
Panel A: Peripheral eurozone countries
 
Panel B: Core eurozone countries
 
Panel C: Stand-alone European countries
 
Note: The CDS spreads reported in basis points pertain to 10 eurozone countries distinguished as core and 
peripheral using the standard classification and four European countries that have not adopted the euro. The first 
vertical line on 31 March 2010 marks the date of the first rescue package for Greece, and the second line on 26 July 
2012 marks the date when the ECB declared that it was prepared to “do whatever it takes to preserve the euro”, 
which is taken as implicit OMT announcement. 
 
Ireland 
Italy 
Portugal 
Spain 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
250
500
750
1000
1250
1500
1750
Austria 
Belgium 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Netherlands 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
250
500
750
1000
1250
1500
1750
Denmark 
Norway 
Sweden 
UK 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
250
500
750
1000
1250
1500
1750
ECB POLICY AND EUROZONE FRAGILITY: WAS DE GRAUWE RIGHT?  7 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for daily sovereign CDS spreads of European countries 
 Panel A. 
Pre-announcement 26.07.2011 – 25.07.2012 
 Panel B. 
Post-announcement 26.07.2012 – 25.07.2013 
 Average Stan. 
Dev. 
Min. Max.   △CDS  Average Stan. 
Dev. 
Min. Max. △CDS 
 Periphery eurozone countries 
Ireland 696.76 110.06 522.25 973.43 - 370.31  222.95 97.65 142.39 550.71 - 401.40 
Italy 452.92 68.16 271.88 586.70 276.63  288.96 63.31 221.96 515.71 - 257.80 
Portugal 1133.30 145.71 781.71 1601.00 - 125.39  453.77 120.28 269.42 881.56 - 465.33 
Spain 435.54 78.32 314.91 634.35 294.89  306.69 80.52 213.72 583.56 - 332.86 
            Core eurozone countries            
Austria 164.72 28.42 86.91 236.13 50.47  50.92 21.12 31.60 127.89 - 94.11 
Belgium 260.92 40.15 175.76 398.78 26.14  88.32 31.10 54.66 191.44 - 128.39 
Finland 70.63 8.95 44.34 87.24 15.54  31.85 7.13 22.02 57.57 - 35.55 
France 184.25 24.23 112.23 245.27 66.34  88.18 22.54 57.11 168.47 - 97.27 
Germany 88.00 11.97 59.97 118.38 20.43  39.45 10.88 22.85 75.82 - 47.36 
Netherlands 103.13 16.58 52.19 133.84 41.82  54.61 10.24 37.98 89.43 - 37.97 
 Non-eurozone countries 
Denmark 117.54 15.23 65.31 157.46 32.04  38.27 16.46 24.50 93.44 - 68.94 
Norway 36.15 8.47 20.84 52.11 4.15  19.76 3.10 15.28 30.96 - 15.40 
Sweden 58.71 10.29 32.69 84.23 19.77  23.61 7.27 17.04 50.99 - 30.63 
United Kingdom 78.25 11.53 58.66 101.64 - 10.24  44.85 7.38 27.60 58.41 - 20.34 
Notes: The table summarises the distribution of daily sovereign CDS spreads of 14 European countries over two 12-month periods surrounding the date of implicit OMT 
announcement on 26 July 2012. CDS is the change from the initial day to the last day of the corresponding period. CDS spreads are in basis points. 
8  SAKA, FUERTES & KALOTYCHOU 
 
The pre-announcement period witnessed a sharp rise in the level and volatility of CDS 
spreads; Ireland and Portugal stood out as exceptions since they had by then received bailout 
packages.13 In the post-announcement period, the CDS spreads of all countries experienced 
an overall decrease from the first day (27 July 2012) to the last (25 July 2013).  
2.2 Commonality in credit risks of eurozone sovereigns 
A principal component (PC) analysis of daily CDS spreads over the pre- and post-
announcement periods was conducted to ascertain changes in the markets’ perception of the 
credit risks of the 10 eurozone sovereigns under consideration. Table 2 reports the results. 
Table 2. Principal component decomposition of daily eurozone CDS spreads 
   Eigenvalues Total variation 
explained (%) 
 Country loadings (eigenvectors) 
           PC1                          PC2 
Panel A. Pre-announcement 26.07.2011 – 25.07.2012 
PC1 5.646 56.46 Austria 0.385 -0.025 
PC2 1.877 75.22 Belgium 0.320 -0.398 
PC3 1.253 87.76 Finland 0.346 0.040 
PC4 0.470 92.46 France 0.405 -0.037 
PC5 0.334 95.80 Germany 0.368 -0.109 
PC6 0.229 98.09 Ireland 0.020 -0.533 
PC7 0.072 98.81 Italy 0.368 0.095 
PC8 0.057 99.38 Netherlands 0.377 0.162 
PC9 0.034 99.72 Portugal 0.097 -0.449 
PC10 0.028 100.00 Spain 0.208 0.552 
Panel B. Post-announcement 26.07.2012 – 25.07.2013 
PC1 9.148 91.48 Austria 0.328 -0.025 
PC2 0.450 95.98 Belgium 0.328 0.039 
PC3 0.223 98.21 Finland 0.322 -0.135 
PC4 0.070 98.91 France 0.325 0.004 
PC5 0.044 99.35 Germany 0.310 -0.344 
PC6 0.028 99.63 Ireland 0.327 0.056 
PC7 0.014 99.77 Italy 0.320 0.106 
PC8 0.011 99.89 Netherlands 0.282 -0.628 
PC9 0.007 99.96 Portugal 0.294 0.613 
PC10 0.004 100.00 Spain 0.323 0.276 
Notes: The table reports eigenvalues j, j=1,…,10 and the proportion of the total variation in the 10 eurozone CDS 
spreads explained by each principal component given by j/j. The last two columns report the eigenvectors or 
country loadings to construct the first and second principal components (denoted PC1 and PC2, respectively). 
The first component in the table can be interpreted as a eurozone credit risk index 
constructed as a weighted average of CDS spreads, and the second one as an index of the 
level of divergence across countries (Longstaff et al., 2011; Arghyrou and Kontonikas, 2012). 
In the pre-announcement period, these two components (denoted PC1 and PC2) explain 75% 
                                                   
13 Ireland was rescued on 22 November 2010, and Portugal was similarly bailed out on 16 May 2011. 
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of the total variation in eurozone CDS spreads, and the explanatory power that can be 
attributed to PC1 is relatively small (56%). However, during the post-announcement period 
the two components capture 96% of the total variation, and PC1 explains 91%. The 
contribution of PC2 is 19% pre-announcement and a marginal 4% post-announcement. 
The country loadings (the contribution of each country to each principal risk factor) in the 
construction of the principal components, reported in the last two columns of Table 2, are 
consistent with this interpretation. The loadings for PC1 are all positive, whereas those of 
PC2 tend to be positively signed for periphery countries and negatively signed for core 
countries, meaning that the latter measures the divergence between the credit risks of these 
two groups of countries Hence, the relatively high explanatory power of PC2 during the pre-
announcement crisis period implies that, at the height of the crisis, investors’ perception of 
eurozone credit risk differentiated considerably between countries. Post-announcement, the 
role of PC1 has notably risen, suggesting that markets began perceiving the eurozone credit 
risk in a more ‘unified’ manner after the ECB assumed the role of lender of last resort.  
In the pre-announcement period, the contribution of Ireland and Portugal to PC1 (a proxy 
for a eurozone credit risk index) is small as suggested by respective loadings of 0.097 and 
0.020. This result aligns well with the observation that Ireland and Portugal were the only 
two eurozone countries that experienced an overall decline in CDS spreads over the pre-
announcement period (see Table 1). This resulted from the two countries receiving EU/IMF 
bailout packages at an early stage, which altered investors’ risk perceptions and decreased 
markedly their systemic contribution to the crisis. A similar conclusion is reached by Adrian 
Alter and Andreas Beyer (2014) using a methodology that quantifies the systemic 
contribution of each sovereign as the net spillover effect in a total measure of net spillovers. 
The loadings of PC2 reveal instead how investors separate eurozone members into two 
distinct groups of countries. The sign of the loading indicates the group to which the 
sovereign belongs. The size of the loading indicates how strongly the country belongs to that 
particular group. Before the announcement, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands and Finland (with 
a small loading) were in the same group with positive coefficients, and the rest of the 
countries were in the other set. Additionally, although the loadings of France and Austria 
were negative, they were very small at -0.037 and -0.025, respectively. This indicates that 
France and Austria may also have been subject to contagion along with the first group. Spain 
clearly had the largest positive loading, reflecting investors’ risk perceptions. Therefore, 
during the pre-announcement period, the market clearly discriminated against countries 
such as Spain and Italy but in favour of Portugal and Ireland, despite the fact that all four of 
these countries are periphery economies.  
After the OMT announcement, the positive loadings of Spain, Italy, Portugal and Ireland 
indicated that the investors classified them together again, in the same periphery group. 
Additionally, Belgium and France (although with small loadings) were subsequently 
classified as ‘periphery’, which suggests that they might have lost their core status in the 
eyes of investors. These findings constitute the first building block in constructing an 
argument that the implicit OMT announcement on 26 July 2012 has induced a more 
fundamental-based pricing approach in the currency union. The principal components 
provide preliminary evidence that self-reinforcing panic responses have made their presence 
felt in the region. 
Figure 2 plots the first two principal components of the eurozone CDS spreads obtained from 
data over the entire two-year period from 26 July 2011 to 25 July 2013. The relative dynamics 
of PC1 and PC2 suggest a structural break at a point that essentially coincides with the 
implicit OMT announcement date on 26 July 2012. 
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Figure 2. First and second principal components of daily eurozone CDS spreads 
 
Note: The vertical dotted line denotes the implicit OMT announcement date on 26 July 2012. The first and second 
principal components are extracted from the correlation matrix of daily CDS spreads over the two-year period 
from 26 July 2011 to 25 July 2013 for 10 eurozone countries, of which four are peripheral (Ireland, Italy, Portugal 
and Spain) and six are core (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany and the Netherlands).  
The two principal components exhibited visibly different dynamics before and after the 
implicit announcement. PC1 experienced wild swings around a high plateau beforehand but 
fell sharply and stabilised around a much lower level shortly afterward. This lends itself to 
the interpretation that the OMT policy has helped decrease market perception of overall 
eurozone credit risk. PC2 followed a steep upward trend in the first half of 2012, echoing 
investors’ view that eurozone credit risk divergence (‘periphery’ versus ‘core’ classification) 
was intensifying; the OMT announcement marked the beginning of a reversal.  
2.3 Spain-specific news  
In order to ascertain the presence of panic with self-fulfilling repercussions, the empirical 
analysis of the dynamics of eurozone credit risks defines ‘abnormal’ changes in the CDS 
spreads of a given European country (the dependent variable) as those driven by news from 
a country encountering difficulties, after controlling for credit risk in the European sovereign 
market as a whole. As proxy for a Europe-wide sovereign risk factor, labelled as 
ܧݑݎ݋݌݁ܽ݊௧
ௌ௢௩, an average of CDS spreads of the eurozone countries in the sample (nine 
countries after setting aside the country whose CDS spread changes will be used as the 
dependent variable)14 and of those of the four stand-alone countries (Denmark, Norway, 
Sweden and the UK) is calculated. 
                                                   
14 The country that is used as dependent variable has to be excluded from the European sovereign risk 
index; hence, the ܧݑݎ݋݌݁ܽ݊௧ variable has to be reconstructed for each of the 10 eurozone countries. 
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The implicit OMT announcement date, 26 July 2012, breaks the two-year sample period into 
two 12-month halves. In fact, although the actual announcement of the OMT programme 
took place on 6 September 2012, many observers have argued that ECB President Draghi’s 
“whatever it takes” speech marked the bold initiative toward the ECB becoming a lender of 
last resort in eurozone sovereign debt markets.15 The analysis of CDS spreads via a principal 
components decomposition using 26 July as break date (see Figure 2) confirms that investors 
had by then already begun to anticipate the OMT programme. Nevertheless, a robustness 
check in the final section of this paper using 6 September as alternative break date does not 
materially challenge the main findings. 
The next task is to choose a periphery eurozone country as the main contagion source over 
the period under study from 26 July 2011 to 25 July 2013. This country ought to have 
experienced the zenith of its debt problems during the sample period and ought to have had 
the highest potential for transmitting the effects of a shock to other eurozone members 
through cross-market linkages. Greece, Portugal and Ireland are not ideal candidates since, 
as mentioned earlier, the literature has reached a consensus that countries receiving IMF/EU 
rescue packages at the early stages of the crisis lost much of their capacity to generate 
contagion later on (e.g., see Alter and Beyer, 2014). In fact, some studies have shown that 
Spain and Italy have played a more pivotal role in the transmission of financial shocks after 
2009 (González-Hermosillo and Johnson, 2014).  
Moreover, the preliminary data analysis reveals that Spanish CDS spreads peaked on 24 July 
2012 (that is, two days prior to the implicit OMT announcement; see Figure 1). Meanwhile, as 
suggested by the magnitude of its loading for PC2 in the analysis reported in the previous 
section, Spain is the sovereign that was punished the most severely by the markets in the 
pre-announcement period (see Table 2). All in all, Spain appears to be a reasonably good 
candidate for testing the eurozone fragility hypothesis. 
Accordingly, it becomes necessary to construct a Spain-specific news variable (ܰ݁ݓݏ௧) that 
will be a key input in the next stage of the analysis to assess whether news pertaining to 
Spain (unrelated to other sovereigns’ fundamentals) act as a ‘sunspot’ (the notion that such 
country-specific bad news can trigger fears that are magnified as investors’ negative 
sentiment is concentrated, hence shifting the equilibrium) in European debt markets. To 
identify the dates of most salient Spain-specific news, one can fit by the method of ordinary 
least squares (OLS) a regression of daily changes in Spanish CDS spreads on daily changes in 
a European sovereign risk index 
  	∆ܥܦ ௌܵ௣௔௜௡,௧ − ݎ௙,௧ = ߙ + ߚ(∆ܧݑݎ݋݌݁ܽ݊௧ − ݎ௙,௧) + ݑௌ௣௔௜௡,௧ (1) 
over the pre- and post-announcement windows. Equation (1) can be seen as an asset pricing 
model in the spirit of the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) of William Sharpe (1964). 
	∆ܥܦ ௌܵ௣௔௜௡,௧ represents the daily percentage changes in Spanish CDS spreads, ݎ௙,௧ is the ECB’s 
daily Euro Overnight Index Average interest rate, ߙ is the constant term in the regression 
and ߚ measures the responsiveness of Spanish CDS spread changes to daily changes in the 
European CDS index (see below for an explanation of how this index is constructed). 
In each period, the days corresponding to the 10 largest (absolute) residuals (|ݑ|ௌ௣௔௜௡,௧ ; that 
is, the difference between an observed value and the value estimated through a function 
such as equation [1]) are cross-checked against news related to Spanish economic 
fundamentals from Reuters. This residual approach is aimed at reducing the possibility of 
‘event contamination’ on the days of Spain-specific news by market-wide (i.e., eurozone) 
                                                   
15 See, for instance, Krugman (2011, 2013) and Pisani-Ferry (2013). 
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shocks that would affect all sovereigns simultaneously. Moreover, among the dates selected 
according to the size of the residuals, those for which there is no corresponding Spanish 
news or for which there is news related to bailout decisions by the European authorities or to 
the ECB’s purchases of government debt are excluded.16 When a date is excluded, the 
procedure is to search for the next candidate and so forth to yield ultimately 10 dates in both 
periods with the most-salient Spain-specific news. It is assumed (using the semi-strong form 
of the efficient markets hypothesis) that a large residual on any day reflects news arriving on 
that day; that is, the CDS premium quickly incorporates all public information.  
Table 3 summarises the Spain-specific news thus identified. Naturally, the news reported in 
an archive such as that of Reuters may not always represent the actual underlying causes of 
significant market movements. Yet it provides a good approximation of what the average or 
representative investor might think about the important events of each day and about their 
potential effects on debt markets (Mink and de Haan, 2013). As a robustness check, a search 
was also undertaken for news in the Bloomberg Businessweek archive; the symbols R (Reuters) 
and B (Bloomberg) are used in Table 3 to signify the news source. 
It is noteworthy that some of the news releases during the post-announcement period were 
about the Spanish government’s reluctance to apply for a rescue programme; this can be 
regarded as signals to markets (and EU officials) about the health of the Spanish economy 
and not about the willingness of the EU/IMF to bail out countries (which would exclude it 
from consideration here). In any case, the inclusion of such post-announcement news can 
only be regarded as the conservative approach since it might lead to overestimation of 
contagion in the post-announcement period, during which one would expect less contagion 
if the eurozone fragility hypothesis were valid.  
Compared with the identification approach employed by Mark Mink and Jakob de Haan 
(2013) to identify Greece-specific news that is based directly on the observed CDS spread 
changes, there is reason to believe that a residual-based approach is more suitable to isolate 
country-specific news. The merit of the latter is that it identifies country-specific event dates 
as days when the actual change in the sovereign CDS premium deviates substantially from 
the expected change according to the CAPM equation (1). Thus, it is possible to pin down 
important news days even when no large CDS spread changes are observed. 
The Spanish-news contagion variable is defined as a discrete variable equal to the OLS 
residual from the CAPM equation (1) on the event dates and zero otherwise, 
 ܰ݁ݓݏ௧,ௌ௣௔௜௡ = ݀௧ ∗ ݑො௧,ௌ௣௔௜௡ (2) 
where ݀௧ is a binary variable equal to 1 on the salient news dates identified and 0 otherwise.  
 
 
                                                   
16 For the purposes of measuring ‘sunspot’ contagion (unnecessary contagion owing to self-reinforcing 
panic), it is important to filter out from the Spain-specific news search those items related to bailouts 
of troubled countries. Such information would lead to an overestimation of the sunspot contagion 
effects. 
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Table 3. Spain-specific daily news 
Date News Description Residual (%) CDS (%) 
Panel A. Pre-announcement 26.07.2011 – 25.07.2012    
    10.08.2011 Spain’s Banca Civica BCIV.MC said on Wednesday its non-performing loan ratio at the end of the first half was 
5.43 percent compared to 4.70 percent at the end of 2010 (R). 
5.77 11.34 
23.08.2011 An agreement between Spain’s ruling Socialists and other political parties over controlling public spending is 
possible, Spanish Prime Minister Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero said on Tuesday (R). 
-5.01 0.64 
23.09.2011 Spain approved the sale of a stake in state-owned lottery operator Loterias y Apuestas del Estado on Friday, 
leaving what will be the country’s biggest initial public offering on track despite tough markets and political 
opposition. While revenue from privatisation sales cannot be used to reduce a European country’s annual 
public deficit under EU rules, the proceeds will mean Spain has to issue less debt (R). 
-4.33 7.14 
14.11.2011 Spain’s borrowing costs risk hitting euro-era highs at auction this week, fuelling fears it is getting dragged back 
into the heart of the eurozone debt crisis as markets await evidence of a new government’s commitment to 
economic reform (R). 
6.07 9.07 
03.01.2012 Registered unemployment in Spain, where almost half of young people are out of work, rose for a fifth month 
in December as the euro area’s fourth-largest economy contracted. The number of people registering for 
unemployment benefits rose 1,897 to 4.42 million, the Labor Ministry in Madrid said in an e-mailed statement 
today (B). 
5.85 6.45 
04.01.2012 The heavily indebted Spanish region of Valencia delayed a 123 million euro repayment to Deutsche Bank by a 
week, its deputy chief minister said, but did not call on the country’s government to guarantee the funds. 
Ratings agency Fitch said in December it believed the government would step in to help Valencia if it faced 
problems (R).  
4.81 7.17 
02.03.2012 Spain set itself a softer deficit target for 2012 than originally agreed under the eurozone’s austerity drive, 
putting a question mark over the credibility of the European Union’s new fiscal pact (R).  
4.65 4.86 
27.03.2012 Spain’s economy is suffering its second recession since 2009, the Bank of Spain said today, a development that 
obstructs the government’s efforts to reorder public finances as it prepares the budget for this year (B). 
5.42 - 0.01 
18.06.2012 Spanish bond yields hit a new euro-era high above 7 percent on Monday as initial relief after a pro-bailout vote 
in Greek elections gave way to pessimism about the problems surrounding the bigger Spanish economy (R). 
4.29 3.76 
09.07.2012 European ministers were set to grant Spain an extra year to reach its deficit targets in exchange for further 
budget savings but remained far from pinning down details of bank rescues and emergency bond-buying that 
are of greater concern to markets. Spain faces budget risks despite the looser target (R). 
5.59 2.38 
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(Cont.) 
Panel B. Post-announcement 26.07.2012 – 25.07.2013    
 30.08.2012 Spanish consumer prices surged in August driven by higher fuel costs and a value-added tax hike in September 
could drive another jump, complicating Spain’s efforts to get out of recession and generate the growth needed 
to reduce its debts (R). 
6.87 3.03 
17.09.2012 Ten-year Spanish government bond yields extended their rise on Monday, driven by pressure ahead of this 
week’s auctions and lingering doubts over when, or if, Spain will seek financial aid (R). 
3.40 1.87 
18.09.2012 Spain will consider seeking a bailout if the conditions imposed are acceptable, Deputy Prime Minister Soraya 
Saenz de Santamaria said as loan defaults at Spanish banks climbed and lending dropped (B). 
5.10 5.52 
17.10.2012 Spanish government bond yields fell to their lowest since early April on Wednesday after Moody’s kept Spain’s 
investment grade rating, removing an immediate threat to the eurozone’s fourth largest economy (R). 
- 5.11 - 16.81 
18.10.2012 Spain’s banks face more loan losses as the pace of an economic slump risks turning a worst-case scenario 
dismissed in stress tests into reality, according to data published by the Bank of Spain on its website today (R). 
4.09 2.63 
22.10.2012 Spanish bonds fell for a second day on speculation Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy’s regional election victory 
gives him more room to delay seeking a bailout that would allow Europe’s central bank to buy the nation’s 
debt (B). 
6.28 3.70 
23.10.2012 The Bank of Spain said on Tuesday that Spain was at risk of missing its 2012 budget deficit target of 6.3 percent 
of GDP, including regions and social security, as a prolonged recession slashes revenues (R). 
3.98 5.68 
04.02.2013 Ten-year Spanish government bond yields rose on Monday as the country’s opposition party called for the 
resignation of Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy over a corruption scandal (R).  
3.94 6.07 
26.02.2013 Spain is no closer to seeking bond-buying help from the European Central Bank than it was before Italy’s 
election, which has triggered renewed market turmoil, Economy Minister Luis de Guindos said on Tuesday (R). 
3.76 7.92 
22.07.2013 Spain’s Prime Minister on Monday said he would soon appear in Parliament to face questions over a corruption 
scandal that has dented his ruling People’s Party’s credibility and upset Spaniards as they go through deep cuts 
in social welfare (R). 
3.55 - 2.16 
Notes: The news source is Reuters (R), or Bloomberg Businessweek (B). The capital asset pricing model (CAPM)–based residuals shown in the penultimate column are 
taken (in absolute value) as a proxy for the salience of the Spain-specific news on the corresponding days listed in the first column. The last column reports the 
actual change in the Spanish CDS spread of the corresponding day with respect to the previous day. The spreads (and residuals) are expressed in percentage points. 
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3. Empirical Results  
We now test De Grauwe’s eurozone fragility hypothesis, which is neatly aligned with the 
multiple-equilibria discourse, using two approaches as outlined in the next two subsections.  
3.1 Event-study analysis  
A capital asset pricing model is employed to measure the abnormal responses of the 
eurozone CDS premiums to idiosyncratic shocks that are defined as Spain-specific news, 
 ∆ܥܦ ௜ܵ,௧ − ݎ௙,௧ = ߚ(∆ܧݑݎ݋݌݁ܽ݊௧ − ݎ௙,௧) + ߙ଴ + ߙଵܰ݁ݓݏௌ௣௔௜௡,௧ + ߝ௜,௧ (3) 
where the regressand (dependent variable) is the daily CDS spread change in excess of risk-
free rate for the ith eurozone country in the sample, and beta (ߚ) is the European risk factor 
loading that represents the sensitivity of that country’s CDS premium (in excess of the risk-
free rate) to the European CDS premium. The extent of the model’s mispricing is captured by 
the term ߙ௧ ≡ ߙ଴ + ߙଵܰ݁ݓݏ௧	, which amounts in the present context to a time-varying 
abnormal return; ߙଵ is the main parameter of interest that captures the spread changes 
induced by ‘contagion’ from Spain. The random innovations (errors) are assumed to be 
independent and identically distributed, ߝ௜,௧ ~ ݅. ݅.݀. (0,ߪ௜ଶ). The risk-free rate (ݎ௙,௧) takes as a 
proxy the Euro Overnight Index Average interest rate from Datastream. This approach is 
similar in spirit to that used by Mink and de Haan (2013) to analyse the impact of news about 
Greece (inferred from changes in its 10-year government bond prices) on bank stock prices. 
The model is estimated for each of the eurozone countries in the sample (in effect, nine 
countries since Spain is adopted as the contagion source) separately over the 12-month pre-
announcement period and the 12-month post-announcement period. The Spain-specific 
ܰ݁ݓݏ௧ variable is constructed from CDS spread data, as explained in the previous section. 
The results are presented in Table 4 for each country and period. 
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Table 4 Spain-specific news effects on eurozone sovereign CDS spreads: two-year window analysis 
Pre-announcement: 26.07.2011 – 25.07.2012 
 Austria Belgium Finland France Germany 
 CAPM APT CAPM APT CAPM APT CAPM APT CAPM APT 
European **1.137 
(0.085) 
**0.751 
(0.067) 
**1.141 
(0.069) 
**0.938 
(0.072) 
**0.822 
(0.081) 
**0.628 
(0.092) 
**1.107 
(0.086) 
**0.850 
(0.125) 
**0.973 
(0.085) 
**0.616 
(0.090) 
Financial 
- 
*0.107 
(0.045) 
- 
0.036 
(0.044) 
- 
**0.110 
(0.039) 
- **0.107 (0.038) - 
0.077 
(0.048) 
Global 
- 
**1.485 
(0.097) 
- 
**1.239 
(0.076) 
- 
**0.965 
(0.077) 
- 
**1.289 
(0.083) 
- **1.312 (0.092) 
ߙ଴ 0.002 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.000 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.000 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
News (ࢻ૚) 0.219 
(0.184) 
**0.432 
(0.099) 
**0.404 
(0.097) 
**0.506 
(0.118) 
-0.086 
(0.178) 
0.210 
(0.138) 
0.207 
(0.134) 
*0.281 
(0.120) 
-0.148 
(0.165) 
0.011 
(0.101) 
Adj. Rଶ 0.57 0.68 0.68 0.72 0.45 0.49 0.59 0.64 0.52 0.63 
 Ireland Italy Netherlands Portugal 
 CAPM APT CAPM APT CAPM APT CAPM APT 
European **0.612 
(0.050) 
**0.636 (0.063) 
**1.236 
(0.054) 
**1.190 (0.097) 
**0.951 
(0.072) 
**0.676 
(0.080) 
**0.681 
(0.064) 
**0.736 (0.078) 
Financial 
- 0.039 (0.026) - **0.089 (0.030) - 
0.104 
(0.055) 
- -0.043 (0.041) 
Global 
- **0.544 (0.075) - **1.098 (0.081) - 
**1.186 
(0.090) 
- **0.607 (0.098) 
ߙ଴ -0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.002) 
0.000 
(0.002) 
News (ࢻ૚) *-0.547 
(0.229) 
*-0.544 (0.240) 
**0.566 
(0.137) 
**0.562 (0.122) 
0.086 
(0.163) 
0.225 
(0.135) 
*-0.410 
(0.175) 
**-0.561 (0.171) 
Adj. Rଶ 0.47 0.48 0.72 0.73 0.50 0.57 0.40 0.41 
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(Cont.) 
Post-announcement: 26.07.2012 – 25.07.2013 
 Austria Belgium Finland France Germany 
 CAPM APT CAPM APT CAPM APT CAPM APT CAPM APT 
European **0.735 
(0.078) 
**0.643 
(0.091) 
**0.870 
(0.106) 
**0.734 
(0.117) 
**0.502 
(0.091) 
**0.449 
(0.108) 
**0.845 
(0.107) 
**0.794 
(0.123) 
**0.726 
(0.127) 
**0.624 
(0.138) 
Financial 
- 
-0.006 
(0.046) 
- 
-0.033 
(0.039) 
- 
-0.034 
(0.050) 
- -0.037 (0.037) - 
-0.015 
(0.042) 
Global 
- 
**0.720 
(0.095) 
- 
**0.895 
(0.079) 
- 
**0.472 
(0.086) 
- **0.718 (0.092) - 
**0.730 
(0.146) 
ߙ଴ *-0.003 
(0.001) 
**-0.004 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
**-0.003 
(0.001) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
**-0.003 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
News (ࢻ૚)  -0.058 
(0.117) 
-0.070 
(0.126) 
-0.107 
(0.281) 
-0.113 
(0.293) 
*-0.236 
(0.118) 
-0.236 
(0.135) 
-0.158 
(0.281) 
-0.137 
(0.316) 
-0.273 
(0.380) 
-0.281 
(0.411) 
Adj. Rଶ 0.41 0.43 0.49 0.52 0.24 0.25 0.46 0.46 0.26 0.27 
 Ireland Italy Netherlands Portugal 
 CAPM APT CAPM APT CAPM APT CAPM APT 
European **0.700 
(0.099) 
**0.665 (0.113) 
**1.096 
(0.088) 
**1.089 (0.107) 
**0.627 
(0.098) 
**0.588 
(0.117) 
**0.846 
(0.138) 
**0.771 (0.143) 
Financial 
- -0.006 (0.045) - 0.065 (0.048) - 
-0.059 
(0.031) 
- **0.171 (0.053) 
Global 
- **0.593 (0.105) - **0.811 (0.067) - 
**0.538 
(0.073) 
- **0.779 (0.108) 
ߙ଴ *-0.003 
(0.001) 
**-0.005 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
News (ࢻ૚)  0.054 
(0.177) 
0.075 
(0.206) 
-0.115 
(0.683) 
-0.144  
(0.722) 
-0.142 
(0.241) 
-0.105 
(0.265) 
-0.288 
(0.283) 
-0.423  
(0.284) 
Adj. Rଶ 0.47 0.47 0.45 0.44 0.40 0.40 0.33 0.36 
Notes: The table reports results of the OLS estimation of the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), equation (3), which controls for European sovereign risk, and the extended 
arbitrage pricing theory (APT)–type counterpart, which additionally controls for global sovereign risk and European financial risk. Autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity 
robust Newey-West standard errors are reported in parentheses. ** and * denote significant coefficients at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. 
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Before the implicit OMT announcement date, the positive estimates of the news coefficient in 
equation (3) suggest that there was contagion from Spain to other eurozone countries such as 
Italy, Belgium, Austria, France and the Netherlands; although the phenomenon appears 
statistically significant only for the first two of these countries. The largest contagion effects 
are observed for Italy, a finding that is consistent with common perceptions and with formal 
evidence of co-movements of Spanish and Italian debt spreads (González-Hermosillo and 
Johnson, 2014). Judging by these results, adverse Spain-specific news influenced market 
participants in their perception of the creditworthiness of other eurozone countries, i.e. the 
CDS spreads of those eurozone countries reacted ‘abnormally’ prior to the announcement. 
This observation is in line with the principal component analysis performed previously, 
which indicated (according to the loadings of PC2; see Table 2) that Spain, Italy, the 
Netherlands, and possibly France and Austria were priced differently from the remaining 
eurozone countries in the 12-month period prior to the implicit OMT announcement. 
The finding of a negative news coefficient for Portugal and Ireland, which is statistically 
significant, implies that bad news specific to the Spanish economy (a widening Spanish CDS 
premium) went hand in hand with substantial declines in these countries’ CDS premiums. 
Various explanations can be offered for this result. One interpretation is that bad news from 
Spain before the OMT might have heightened market expectations of an ECB intervention 
through the Securities Market Programme (SMP). Given the unclear and arbitrary nature of 
the SMP, each setback for Spain might have been perceived as raising the likelihood of ECB 
debt purchases in the secondary markets, which, in turn, would have reduced the CDS 
spreads of Portugal and Ireland. Another interpretation is that the focus of the crisis (news) 
was shifting away from bailed-out countries (Portugal and Ireland) to non-bailed-out ones 
such as Spain and Italy. Hence, market players were absorbing positive information about 
the countries that applied strict austerity measures (in exchange for the rescue packages) by 
comparing them to the new ‘strugglers’, which were resisting the austerity measures and 
declining the bailout programmes offered to them.  
The results displayed in Table 4 based on CDS data are consistent with the evidence of 
eurozone contagion provided by Mink and de Haan (2013) from bond yield data. In each 
case, a significant, abnormal deterioration (i.e., in excess of what a CAPM-type model would 
predict) is detected in the creditworthiness of various eurozone members in response to 
country-specific bad news from another eurozone country, Spain in this study, Greece in the 
other. However, whereas Mink and de Haan explain it as ‘wake-up calls’, whereby markets 
draw conclusions about sovereigns by observing the changes in the fundamentals of other 
countries, here this contagion is ascribed mostly to panic.  
The conjecture that the pre-announcement spillovers from Spain to various other eurozone 
countries largely reflected eurozone fragility (linked to the absence of a lender of last resort) 
follows De Grauwe (2011a,b) and the multiple-equilibria line of reasoning. Accordingly, the 
term ‘sunspot contagion’ is used to describe this phenomenon. Before the OMT programme 
was introduced, the eurozone lacked a device to stop debt runs (short-term liquidity 
problems), which, through the actions of investors trying to avert losses, morphed into a 
solvency crisis. Eurozone CDS spreads were therefore highly sensitive to news releases about 
Spain’s fundamentals not because of the inherent nature of the information they conveyed 
but because, in the absence of a lender of last resort, adverse developments coloured 
investors’ sentiment and channelled their market responses toward a ‘bad’ equilibrium. 
The second part of Table 4 sets out results of the CAPM equation (3) estimated over the post-
announcement period. Interestingly, no significantly positive news coefficient is obtained 
following the implicit OMT announcement for any of the eurozone member countries 
examined. Thus, there are no significant Spanish news spillovers to other eurozone countries 
ECB POLICY AND EUROZONE FRAGILITY: WAS DE GRAUWE RIGHT?  19 
 
after 26 July 2012, which confirms the conjecture’s validity. This is the crux of the argument: 
if the response of eurozone CDS spreads to Spain-specific news were in fact fundamentals 
based (i.e., news about Spain prompting investors to assess the vulnerability of other 
countries according to fundamentals) as the wake-up call hypothesis states, then one would 
not expect a lender of last resort announcement to have any mitigating effect on such 
contagion. The sharp contrast observed in the pre- and post-announcement periods 
regarding the influence of Spain-specific news on eurozone CDS spreads, as shown in Table 
4, instead points toward self-fulfilling panic reactions in the region as an explanation for the 
transmission of the sovereign debt crisis from one eurozone country to another.  
In sum, it seems fair to interpret the evidence as suggesting that the OMT announcement (the 
willingness of the ECB to act as lender of last resort) has been successful in curbing the panic 
to which markets have been susceptible since the early 2011 outbreak of eurozone debt 
problems. Results of the event study show that, when there is no liquidity facility in the debt 
markets of a region under a common currency (such as the euro), it leaves room for fears 
that, through market movements that are inadvertently coordinated, become self-fulfilling to 
produce undesirable outcomes. 
3.2 Herding contagion analysis  
Evidence on the validity of De Grauwe’s fragility hypothesis for the eurozone may be further 
provided through a herding contagion analysis. The main idea is to ascertain the 
simultaneous transmission/occurrence of substantial negative shocks among various sets of 
eurozone and non-eurozone countries. Measuring the clustering of adverse events 
constitutes “the cleanest approach to measuring the most common definition of contagion – 
any transmission of extreme negative shocks” (Forbes, 2012, p. 9).  
The analysis seeks to demonstrate that the clustering of large negative shocks (the 
simultaneous rise in sovereign bond yields or CDS premiums that cannot be explained by 
common risk factors) relates to investors’ fear of losses as opposed to a process of 
discovering unsettling issues relating to fundamentals. Such sudden rise in CDS spreads of a 
group of countries would then represent a “debt run” against the particular group at a 
particular time, driven by panic and ultimately countered by the OMT programme. 
In order to derive residuals (which, as the departure of the measured results from what is 
predicted by formula, serve as proxies for unexpected shocks), begin by estimating the 
CAPM equation over the two-year sample period around the implicit OMT announcement 
 ∆ܥܦ 	ܵ௜,௧ − ݎ௙,௧ = ߙ + ߚ(∆ܧݑݎ݋݌݁ܽ݊௧ − ݎ௙,௧) + 	௜,௧ (4) 
for each country i=1,…,N in the sample (N = 14 sovereigns). Thus, a daily time series of 
residuals per country ߝ௜̂,௧ , ݐ = 1, … . ,ܶ (the two-year sample enables T = 523 residuals per 
country) is developed. Upon calculating the empirical distribution of residuals for each 
country, focus is placed on the left-tail residuals (as proxies for extreme shocks), defined 
using the 20th- or 10th-percentile criteria for the extreme end of the distribution. Finally, it is 
possible to identify days over the two-year sample period when a large proportion of 
countries simultaneously experienced extreme shocks; such episodes of cross-national 
clustering of shocks (80% of countries or more) comprise the herding contagion index. This 
technique is similar in spirit to that employed by Beirne and Fratzscher (2013).  
Based on the study’s previous findings (from the principal components decomposition of 
CDS spreads in Section 2.1 and the Spain-specific news analysis in Section 3.1), countries are 
assigned to three groups. The first consists of Spain, Italy, Belgium, France and Austria, as 
their CDS premiums have been particularly sensitive to adverse shocks in the absence of a 
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liquidity facility; this is called the ‘contagion’ set. The second group is made up of Finland, 
Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands and Portugal; according to the prior results, these were 
less likely to be affected by adverse shocks during the two-year period under study; call it 
the ‘non-contagion’ set. The third group consists of four non-eurozone countries (Denmark, 
Sweden, Norway and the UK); this is the control set. According to the multiple-equilibria 
view, as encapsulated in De Grauwe’s eurozone fragility hypothesis, the market perception 
of the creditworthiness of these stand-alone countries is unlikely to be bedevilled by panic 
precisely because they retain sovereign control over their own currencies. Figure 3 plots the 
herding contagion indices obtained for the three sets of countries.  
Examining first the ‘contagion’ set, it is clear that cross-national clusters of extreme shocks 
occur more frequently prior to (on 22 days) than after the implicit OMT announcement. With 
the 20th-percentile criteria, only three clusters are identified following the OMT 
announcement. Two of these occur in the days immediately before the explicit ECB 
announcement of the OMT programme on 6 September 2012; they would not be counted as 
post-announcement herding contagion events at all had the explicit OMT announcement 
been adopted as the fulcrum. The third cluster is dated 20 November 2012, and, interestingly, 
it is seen also in the ‘non-contagion’ set; hence, it must be associated with a eurozone-wide 
systematic risk factor that the pricing model presented here does not capture. Analogous 
results are obtained using the most conservative 10th-percentile criteria to focus on residuals 
located further along the left-tail.  
Now attention turns to the other two sets of countries. Both the ‘non-contagion’ eurozone set 
and the non-eurozone set experience few clusters of extreme adverse shocks, and, most 
important, the frequency of them is essentially similar over the pre- and post-announcement 
terms. There is no change of pattern after the implicit OMT announcement date in the 
amount of herding contagion identified for these countries.  
Summing up, the analysis in this section points to significant herding contagion in the year 
before the OMT announcement precisely for the same eurozone countries that were 
identified earlier as being the most vulnerable to contagion. However, instances of herding 
contagion became far less frequent after the ECB president pledged to do “whatever it takes” 
to keep the euro together. The logical interpretation of these findings is that the herding 
contagion was mainly attributable to panic of a self-fulfilling nature that pushed these 
countries into a worse equilibrium than their fundamentals would warrant.  
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Figure 3. Herding contagion indices for three sets of countries, CAPM pricing equation 
Panel A: 20th-percentile rule               Panel B: 10th-percentile rule                  
 
Contagion Euro countries Non-contagion Euro countries  Stand-alone countries 
Note: The vertical dotted line denotes the implicit OMT announcement. The graph plots on each day of the pre- and post-announcement periods the percentage of countries in 
the corresponding set that experienced large negative shocks according to the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) equation (4) using the 20th-percentile or 10th-percentile 
criteria. Only days when at least 80% of the countries experienced large shocks are plotted. The contagion set of eurozone countries comprises Spain, Italy, France, Belgium and 
Austria. The non-contagion set of eurozone countries consists of Portugal, Ireland, Germany, the Netherlands and Finland. The stand-alone set (non-eurozone) of countries is 
constituted by Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
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3.3 Additional results 
The robustness of the results reported in the previous sections can be assessed by 
considering a pricing equation that is grounded in the arbitrage pricing theory (APT) of 
Stephen A. Ross (1976). This approach is enhanced by recent empirical studies that use 
market indices as proxies for unobserved sources of commonality among sovereigns (Bekaert 
et al., 2011; Manasse and Zavalloni, 2013). Formally, the adapted APT pricing equation can 
be written as follows: 
  	∆ܥܦ ௌܵ௣௔௜௡,௧ − ݎ௙,௧ = ߙ + ߚଵ൫∆ܧݑݎ݋݌݁ܽ݊௧ − ݎ௙,௧൯ (5) 
+ߚଶ൫∆ܨ݈݅݊ܽ݊ܿ݅ܽ௧ − ݎ௙,௧൯ + ߚଷ൫∆ܩ݈݋ܾ݈ܽ௧ − ݎ௙,௧൯ + ݑௌ௣௔௜௡,௧ 
where the loadings or betas (ߚଵ,ߚଶ,ߚଷ) measure the sensitivity of variations in the country’s 
daily spread to the daily changes in three risk factors: one for global sovereigns, another for 
European sovereigns and a third for financial intermediaries. The regression is estimated 
over the pre- and post-OMT announcement periods to identify Spain-specific news dates. 
As proxy for the global sovereign credit risk factor, labelled ܩ݈݋ܾ݈ܽ௧,, an equal-weighted 
combination of the CDS spreads of the same 26 (non-European) sovereigns as used in Francis 
A. Longstaff, Sanjay Mithaland Eric Neis (2011) has been chosen. Descriptive statistics of the 
constituent CDS spreads over the two-year period around the OMT announcement are 
provided in Appendix A. The European credit risk factor ܧݑݎ݋݌݁ܽ݊௧ௌ௢௩ is as defined in 
Section 2.3 above. The proxy for the European financial risk factor (ܧݑݎ݋݌݁ܽ݊௧ி௜௡) is the 
Markit iTraxx Senior Financials index, which is composed of the 25 most liquid CDS 
reference entities for senior debt issued by European financial institutions. All the daily 
observations are obtained from Datastream. 
The evolution of the three risk factors is shown in Figure 4 as daily CDS spread levels (Panel 
A) and changes (Panel B). Panel A reveals strong correlations, particularly between the 
European sovereign risk index and the European financial intermediary risk index. Those 
correlations occur through two main channels. One channel reflects the way in which 
European credit risk is tied in with the greater global financial/economic landscape. A 
second channel is country-specific and implies that the default risks of financial 
intermediaries feed into the sovereign country’s borrowing costs though the signals sent to 
investors by the size and frequency of bailout/rescue guarantees. And, the other way round, 
the increased default risk of a sovereign will feed into the balance sheets of its financial 
institutions because they hold government debt (Acharya et al., 2011; Arghyrou and 
Kontonikas, 2012; Alter and Beyer, 2014).  
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Figure 4. Global sovereign risk, European sovereign risk and European financial risk 
Panel A: Global and European CDS spreads (daily levels) 
 
Panel B: Global and European CDS spreads (daily changes) 
 
European sovereign risk Global sovereign risk European financial risk 
Note: The first vertical line (31 March 2010) marks the outbreak of the eurozone debt crises, when Greece 
received its first rescue package. The second line (26 July 2011) denotes the implicit OMT announcement 
date. The global sovereign risk index is an average of CDS spreads of 26 non-European countries. The 
European sovereign risk index is an average of the CDS spreads of 10 eurozone countries (Austria, Belgium, 
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain) plus four stand-alone 
countries (Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom). The European financial risk index is the 
Markit iTraxx Senior Financials index, which is composed of the 25 most liquid CDS reference entities for 
senior debt issued by European financial institutions. The time span is 5 December 2008 to 25 July 2013. All 
the indices have been normalised to 100 in 2009. 
However, the correlation evident in the stationary daily changes in the CDS indices is much 
lower, as one would expect, from a low of 0.39 between ∆ܩ݈݋ܾ݈ܽ௧ and ∆ܧݑݎ݋݌݁ܽ݊௧ௌ௢௩to a high 
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constant (e.g., after the announcement, the standard deviation of ∆ܧݑݎ݋݌݁ܽ݊௧ி௜௡ is 0.0459 and 
that of the Euro Overnight Index Average is 0.0008).17 
Most of the Spain-specific news dates thus identified coincide with those reported earlier in 
Table 3; the only one change is that 23 September 2011 is replaced by 29 July 2011 (pre-
announcement).18 For the Spain-specific news variable, ܰ݁ݓݏ௧,ௌ௣௔௜௡ = ݀௧ ∗ ݑො௧,ௌ௣௔௜௡  (equation 
[2] from Section 2.3), ݀௧ is 1 at the identified news dates and 0 elsewhere, and ݑො௧,ௌ௣௔௜௡  is the 
new residual sequence. Although the magnitude of the residuals at the identified dates is 
different for the APT model and the CAPM model initially employed, the news variables 
calculated from each are close as borne out by a Pearson correlation of 0.9595 (p-value=0.00). 
The estimation results for the APT counterpart of equation (4) using three systematic risk 
factors are recorded under the column labelled APT in Table 4. Before the OMT implicit 
announcement, the coefficient of the news variable was positive and significant for Italy, 
Belgium, France and Austria. After the announcement, none of the news coefficients was 
positive, and they were all insignificant. Likewise, the herding contagion indexes derived 
from the APT model equation (5) made no meaningful difference to the findings. 
Second, the event-study analysis of Section 3.1 is undertaken again, accounting for the time 
variation in the risk factor loadings (the beta coefficients). The idea of this robustness check is 
to gauge the extent to which not allowing for such time variation might bias the news 
identification. For this purpose, the residuals are obtained by a rolling estimation approach; 
namely, the residual for day t is obtained as the difference between the actual CDS change on 
that day and the expected CDS change for that day obtained by using the coefficients of the 
pricing model, equation (1), estimated over the corresponding window (covering a one-year 
period of 261 business days) ending on day t-1. The window is then rolled forward one day 
to obtain the residual for day t+1 and so forth. That helps better capture the surprise 
component (“unexpected shock”) on day t. This rolling exercise made no meaningful 
difference to the news identification; in fact, about 90% of the dates thus detected matched 
the dates in Table 3.  
It was also reassuring to repeat the herding contagion analysis by re-estimating the CAPM 
equation (4) and APT equation (5) over rolling windows. The results based on the CAPM 
model, reported in Figure 5, and those based on the APT model (not displayed here) are 
virtually undistinguishable from those reported earlier in Figure 4.  
 
                                                   
17 The factor orthogonalization approach used by Geert Bekaert and colleagues (2009) and Manasse 
and Zavalloni (2013) is applied here, adopting the residuals of the OLS regression ܧݑݎ݋݌݁ܽ݊௧௦௢௩ = ܽ +
ܾܩ݈݋ܾ݈ܽ௧ + ݑ௧ as the orthogonalized European sovereign risk factor. This residual construction 
exercise is repeated 10 times, one for each of the ܧݑݎ݋݌݁ܽ݊௧௦௢௩ indices available for each country 
(whose CDS spread change was excluded from the European sovereign index construction). The next 
step is to run the regression ܧݑݎ݋݌݁ܽ݊௧
௙௜௡ = ܽ + ܾܩ݈݋ܾ݈ܽ௧ + ܿܧݑݎ݋݌݁ܽ݊௧௦௢௩ + ݑ௧ and take the estimated 
residuals as the orthogonalized European financial risk factor; again this needs to be repeated 10 
times, one for each ܧݑݎ݋݌݁ܽ݊௧௦௢௩, to obtain an orthogonalized ܧݑݎ݋݌݁ܽ݊௧
௙௜௡  per country. However, the 
main findings in the subsequent empirical analysis of the paper would not materially change one were 
to employ directly the non-orthogonalized factors; detailed results are available from the authors 
upon request. 
18 The Spain (Reuters) news on 29 July 2011 was: “Moody’s puts Spain on watchlist on Friday adding 
to concerns that a Greek rescue package has done little to halt the spread of Europe’s debt crisis”. 
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Figure 5. Herding contagion indices for three sets of countries, CAPM rolling estimation 
Panel A: 20th-percentile rule                Panel B: 10th-percentile rule 
 
  Contagion Euro countries Non-contagion Euro countries Stand-alone countries 
Note: This is the counterpart of Figure 3, based on rolling estimation of the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) equation (4) to identify the shocks. An estimation window of 
261 days is rolled forward one day at a time. The vertical dotted line denotes the implicit OMT announcement. The graph plots on each day of the pre- and post-
announcement periods the percentage of countries in the corresponding set that experienced large shocks using the 20th-percentile or 10th-percentile criteria. Only days 
when at least 80% of the countries experienced large negative shocks are plotted. The contagion set of eurozone countries comprises Spain, Italy, France, Belgium and 
Austria. The non-contagion eurozone set of eurozone consists of Ireland, Germany, the Netherlands and Finland. The stand-alone set (non-eurozone) is constituted by 
Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
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An additional robustness check applies a narrower one-year window for the event study, 
which amounts to a six-month pre-announcement period (26 January to 25 July 2012) and a 
six-month post-announcement period (27 July 2012 to 25 January 2013). The main purpose of 
this analysis, summarised in Table 5, is to measure in a more ‘sterilised’ manner the impact 
of the OMT announcement: A shorter window serves better to isolate the analysis from 
changes in the fundamental channels of contagion (e.g., trade or financial links): Despite the 
essential stability of these fundamental channels, looking at a shorter time interval ensures 
that they remain constant and cannot be held responsible for driving the changes in the 
contagion effects across the countries in the sample; thus, any change can be directly 
associated with the OMT announcement. 
One can repeat the same CAPM-based procedure described in Section 3.1 to construct the 
Spain-specific news variable, ܰ݁ݓݏௌ௣௔௜௡,௧, with the only difference being that the focus is now 
on the five most salient events (instead of 10) in each period, owing to the smaller sample.19 
Table 5. Spain-specific news effects on eurozone sovereign CDS spreads: one-year window analysis 
 Pre-announcement:  
26.01.2012 – 25.07.2012 
Post-announcement:  
26.07.2012 – 25.01.2013 
 CAPM APT CAPM APT 
Austria **0.354 
(0.124) 
**0.299 
(0.109) 
0.023 
(0.133) 
-0.023 
(0.134) 
Belgium **0.472 
(0.106) 
**0.447 
(0.112) 
0.029 
(0.375) 
0.063 
(0.376) 
Finland 0.521 
(0.324) 
0.445 
(0.379) 
-0.121 
(0.142) 
-0.054 
(0.142) 
France **0.563 
(0.214) 
*0.526 
(0.220) 
0.143 
(0.227) 
0.250 
(0.271) 
Germany 0.224 
(0.207) 
0.140 
(0.170) 
-0.106 
(0.414) 
-0.025 
(0.428) 
Ireland *-1.031 
(0.481) 
-0.939 
(0.494) 
0.062 
(0.202) 
0.155 
(0.240) 
Italy **0.536 
(0.130) 
**0.459 
(0.076) 
-0.733 
(0.905) 
-0.820 
(1.010) 
Netherlands **0.630 
(0.214) 
**0.560 
(0.197) 
-0.084 
(0.309) 
0.008 
(0.321) 
Portugal *-0.462 
(0.231) 
-0.448 
(0.249) 
-0.044 
(0.220) 
-0.305 
(0.229) 
Notes: The table reports the OLS estimates of the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), equation (3), 
which controls for European sovereign risk, and the arbitrage pricing theory (APT)–type equation, 
which additionally controls for global sovereign risk and European financial risk. Autocorrelation 
and heteroskedasticity robust Newey-West standard errors are reported in parentheses. ** and * 
denote significant coefficients at the 1% and 5% level, respectively.  
                                                   
19 The significant news events associated with the dates identified over this smaller period are 
available upon request. 
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The results in Table 5 are in line with the main finding that the significant contagion effect of 
Spain-specific events on the CDS premiums of other eurozone countries during the pre-
announcement phase lost its significance after the OMT announcement. 
In a final robustness check, instead of adopting ECB President Draghi’s ‘whatever it takes’ 
speech (26 July 2012, the implicit OMT announcement date), the official OMT announcement 
(6 September 2012) is chosen instead as the midpoint for the analysis. The results (not laid 
out here) do not in any significant way challenge the main findings.20 
4. Policy Implications 
The fragility hypothesis, as it concerns the eurozone, asserts that countries that have adopted 
the euro are prone to sudden reversals in capital flows triggered by investors’ lack of 
confidence that can ultimately trigger the very default they fear; this is what De Grauwe 
(2011a) calls ‘devilish’ self-fulfilling dynamics. Could this happen in the United States, the 
United Kingdom or Japan? Surely not, because these countries can count on their central 
banks to inject liquidity into the markets in the event of a cash squeeze. Absent the ECB 
assuming the mantle of lender of last resort, countries using the euro are treated in sovereign 
debt markets as if they had the status of emerging countries that issue debt in a foreign 
currency. The OMT programme represents a big step toward completion of the European 
currency union and avoiding such fragility. This policy stance can ensure a single 
equilibrium for all eurozone countries.  
This study’s finding that eurozone debt markets have been subject to panic responses that 
become self-reinforcing serves to undermine the “you deserve what you get” attitude of 
hard-core fundamentalists. The evidence provided above that the implicit OMT 
announcement has curbed such self-fulfilling dynamics (as one, if not the only, channel of 
contagion) in eurozone debt markets highlights the institutional role played by the ECB in 
preventing debt runs in the region. Overall, the results support De Grauwe’s fragility 
hypothesis. 
Recent developments have stirred contention over ECB President Draghi’s ‘whatever it 
takes’ bond-buying programme. In response to German Eurosceptics’ protests against the 
legality of the OMT programme, the German Constitutional Court recently (in February 
2014) passed the case on to the European Court of Justice; at the time of this writing, the ECJ 
has still not produced a response. This paper contributes to making an informed judgment 
on the matter by showing that the OMT announcement has been effective in countering 
‘unnecessary’ contagion in the euro area. The evidence indicates that the new policy stance 
has helped not only nations considered to be on the periphery (such as Italy and Spain) but 
also core members (such as Belgium and France) that are struggling to restore their 
economies to the shape they were in prior to the crisis, even as their southern neighbours 
face the risk of deflation and stagnation. On that basis, the new ECB policy stance can be 
seen as beneficial for the interests of the eurozone as a whole.  
5. Conclusion 
The turmoil in eurozone debt markets that erupted more than five years ago fuelled a heated 
debate among two old schools of thought. While ‘fundamentalists’ primarily blamed euro-
area countries’ deteriorating fundamentals, multiple-equilibria advocates argued that a 
                                                   
20 All the unreported results pertaining to the robustness checks are available from the authors upon 
request. 
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dynamics in which irrational fears feed off each other has been at play in the eurozone. 
According to the latter view, the European Central Bank ought to accept responsibility as the 
lender of last resort in government debt markets to counter such dynamics (De Grauwe, 
2011b). Representing a major departure in terms of policy stance, the ECB can by doing so 
prevent eurozone sovereign debt markets from being pushed toward a worse equilibrium 
than their fundamentals warrant.  
ECB President Mario Draghi remarked on 26 July 2012 that the Bank was prepared to do 
“whatever it takes” to keep the euro together; shortly thereafter, the ECB announced the 
Outright Monetary Transactions programme. As the financial press summed it up, “The 
remark triggered a lasting rally in government-bond markets in southern Europe. The ECB 
did not even have to purchase any government bonds. Mario Draghi’s words were 
enough.”21 
This paper has provided empirical evidence regarding the eurozone fragility hypothesis and, 
relatedly, on the contagion-mitigating effects of the new ECB policy stance. An event-study 
analysis revealed significant contagion from idiosyncratic bad news specific to Spain that 
affected other eurozone countries but only prior to the ‘implicit OMT announcement’ date of 
26 July 2012. Additionally, frequent cross-national clusters of large shocks (so-called herding 
contagion) showed up among the same set of eurozone countries (including Spain), but the 
herding contagion became muted following the ECB announcement.  
These results suggest that that the new ECB policy embodied in the OMT has curbed the self-
fulfilling dynamics and hence the ‘unnecessary’ contagion in eurozone debt markets. On this 
basis, a decision against the OMT by the European Court of Justice would not be in the best 
interests of the region. The empirical evidence presented in this paper calls for the OMT to be 
formalised into European law. 
 It is to be hoped that this paper inspires more research to answer further questions as the 
debate carries on. For example, attempts to ascertain if the ECB’s new role as a force of last 
resort in the eurozone banking system has reduced the amount of systemic risk in European 
debt markets, as defined in Andrew Ang and Francis A. Longstaff (2013), will benefit all who 
are concerned about the issue. 
  
                                                   
21 In Brian Blackstone, “ECB considers action to stem low inflation”, Wall Street Journal, European 
edition, 26 March 2014. 
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Appendix A. Descriptive Statistics for daily (non-European) sovereign CDS spreads from 26 July 2011 to 25 July 2013 
Country Average Standard. Deviation Min. Max. △CDS 
Brazil 137.64 24.54 99.23 211.18 65.83 
Bulgaria 230.90 109.68 90.85 441.64 - 103.66 
Chile 94.51 22.57 61.11 163.41 17.47 
China 103.04 30.87 55.81 199.57 22.44 
Colombia 123.16 28.07 75.16 219.50 16.60 
Croatia 387.70 103.42 233.65 581.87 4.22 
Hungary 425.21 122.66 241.21 729.89 16.59 
Israel 156.40 29.39 105.24 219.50 - 29.65 
Japan 93.56 23.29 55.38 152.64 - 22.97 
Republic of Korea 108.53 36.65 56.26 234.73 - 17.70 
Malaysia 108.14 28.11 66.02 213.73 13.18 
Mexico 122.59 26.78 74.17 206.76 8.07 
Pakistan 900.04 30.21 816.31 999.75 - 34.74 
Panama 120.80 26.83 74.82 211.02 25.16 
Peru 129.73 31.51 82.05 219.41 10.07 
Philippines 138.98 39.05 80.32 268.35 - 16.53 
Poland 165.25 74.72 73.73 337.88 - 74.24 
Qatar 101.78 24.11 62.24 148.45 - 19.48 
Romania 311.88 93.87 180.57 488.60 - 40.92 
Russia 186.78 46.17 116.41 325.65 33.96 
Slovakia 177.27 75.67 86.72 306.01 - 24.74 
South Africa 150.52 21.27 107.95 233.20 78.33 
Thailand 128.56 35.99 81.96 239.06 - 11.81 
Turkey 201.05 59.58 109.82 339.22 5.23 
Ukraine 720.73 124.41 448.78 974.27 330.98 
Venezuela 847.56 155.17 571.42 1249.00 - 85.37 
Notes: All the CDS spreads are measured in basis points. △CDS denotes the change in the spread from the initial day to the last day of the sample period. 
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